One of the motives of Eagleton’s book is to confront an idea that had become fairly popular in the 1980s: that those of us living the West are living in a time period that lacks ideology. This proposition had come both from conservatives, as a way to further naturalize the rather strange combination of capitalism and representative republicanism that defines Western politics, and from the nihilism of writers such as Baudrillard. A number of conservative articulations pose problems for theories of ideology since they are so cynical: for example, a Wall Street investor knows that his job makes money by investing in companies that are only profitable because they ignore all safety standards. He nonetheless invests in those companies and fights any attempt to regulate safety. Baudrillard takes it a step further and, for example, would say that the reason why the American people don’t form a new party to challenge the dominance of the Democrats and the Republicans is because they know that a new party would become just as corrupt as those two.
Eagleton rehabilitates these two positions as evidence that ideology still exists by calling upon two thinkers. One is Peter Sloterdijk, who coined the expression “enlightened false consciousness.” So for example, the investor described above knows that something is wrong because the workers are threatened, but refuses to adjust his investment strategy. However, Eagleton thinks that Sloterdijk doesn’t go quite far enough, so he calls on the aid of Slavoj Zizek. In Zizek’s analysis, this investor would not only prevent regulation of the factory but would do so while knowing that his job makes him miserable and is making the planet a worse place to live. Eagleton therefore paraphrases Zizek as saying “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it.” (Ideology: An Introduction, 40) This insight into how ideology works with our motives is important, as it suggests just how little it matters whether or not we realize that a goal is illusory. Eagleton writes: “Ideology, in other words, not just a matter of what I think about a situation; it is somehow inscribed in that situation itself.” (ibid.)
What does this have to Greek and Roman slavery? Well you may remember that a number of my posts have been on the slaves in Plautus’ Roman comedies. One type of slave character in particular presents us with a number of difficulties for trying to understand the relationship between Roman slaves and owners. These slaves deceive their masters, arrange for their own manumissions at the expense of others and often present themselves as the writers and directors of a play within a play. They all appear quite powerful, which, as powerful people know, is one of the main tricks about becoming powerful in the first place.
However these slaves never challenge the status quo. That is, while they devise machinations to ensure their own manumission, they never run away or organize mutinies. In their own strange ways they obey their masters, despite being quite aware that their masters are bumbling fools.
I’m inclined to think that Plautus describes his slaves adopting to the Roman naturalness of slavery in a way similar to what Zizek articulates: these slaves may recognize that they are smarter than their masters, but they don’t challenge the ideology that their masters are superior to them. They recognize the illusion of their master’s supremacy, but they follow it anyway.
Eagleton rehabilitates these two positions as evidence that ideology still exists by calling upon two thinkers. One is Peter Sloterdijk, who coined the expression “enlightened false consciousness.” So for example, the investor described above knows that something is wrong because the workers are threatened, but refuses to adjust his investment strategy. However, Eagleton thinks that Sloterdijk doesn’t go quite far enough, so he calls on the aid of Slavoj Zizek. In Zizek’s analysis, this investor would not only prevent regulation of the factory but would do so while knowing that his job makes him miserable and is making the planet a worse place to live. Eagleton therefore paraphrases Zizek as saying “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it.” (Ideology: An Introduction, 40) This insight into how ideology works with our motives is important, as it suggests just how little it matters whether or not we realize that a goal is illusory. Eagleton writes: “Ideology, in other words, not just a matter of what I think about a situation; it is somehow inscribed in that situation itself.” (ibid.)
What does this have to Greek and Roman slavery? Well you may remember that a number of my posts have been on the slaves in Plautus’ Roman comedies. One type of slave character in particular presents us with a number of difficulties for trying to understand the relationship between Roman slaves and owners. These slaves deceive their masters, arrange for their own manumissions at the expense of others and often present themselves as the writers and directors of a play within a play. They all appear quite powerful, which, as powerful people know, is one of the main tricks about becoming powerful in the first place.
However these slaves never challenge the status quo. That is, while they devise machinations to ensure their own manumission, they never run away or organize mutinies. In their own strange ways they obey their masters, despite being quite aware that their masters are bumbling fools.
I’m inclined to think that Plautus describes his slaves adopting to the Roman naturalness of slavery in a way similar to what Zizek articulates: these slaves may recognize that they are smarter than their masters, but they don’t challenge the ideology that their masters are superior to them. They recognize the illusion of their master’s supremacy, but they follow it anyway.